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Introduction
Itwasjust over ayear agothatjournalists,politi-
cians,businessmen and even some economists were
ponderingthe “end of globalcapitalism.”A number of
Asian currencies and financial markets were on the
brink of collapse. Major fi.mmeialwoes existed in
Indonesiz South Kore%Russi& Japa Thailancl the
Philippine andMalaysia Virtuallyallthecountriesof
East Asia were f- financial crises in their stock
market$ their currencies, and their international in-
vestment standing. Western leaderswere considering
interest-ratecuts to stemthe capital flightout of these
countries. Influential leaders from both the public
sectorand theprivate sectorurged U.S. action.Treas-
ury SecretaryRobert Rubin (1998) stressedthat U.S.
supportof the InternationalMonetaryFund @NIF) was
imperativeto stabilizingthe global financialsituation:
“Every day that Congress does not approve . . . IMF
fin-ding increases our vulnerability to a crisis, and
decreases confidence in global markets.” Billionaire
hedge fund manager George Soros (1998) called on
tie U.S. Congress to provide billions of dollars to the
IMF to allow the IMF to intervene eflketively and to
forestall the “disintegration of the global capitalist
system.”
Concerns over the potential collapse of capi-
talism were widespread. James Buchan (1998), in
“The World’s Slow Nightmare,” asked whether
capitalism-which had developed under particular
conditions in Europe aud North America-was
really suited to be a “one-system-fits-all prescription
for the world.” Robert Samuelson (1998) suggested
that East Asian cultures and values simply did not
embrace the capitalist ethic:”. . . market capitd.ism
is not just an economic system. It is also a set of
cultural values that emphasizes the virtue of compe-
tition, the legitimacy of profit, and the value of
freedom. . . .Even when countries adopt some
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trappings of capitalism they may not embrace the
basic valuesthat make the system work.” It was easy
to wonder whether we were simply watching a
difficult transition horn one financial state to an-
other or witnessing a fundamental transformation of
existing economic institutions.
We no longer hear the frets and concerns over
the failure of global capitalism. Unfortunately,
however, the lack of current headline news about
worldwide currencymarkets does not mean that the
problems have gone away or that we are no longer
troubled by these events. In fac$ U.S. production
agriculture aud U.S. food products exports both
have along way to go before they recover from the
worldwide macroeconomic conditions of 1997 and
1998. With an eyeto understandinghistory so asnot
to repeat it, we examine the events that brought on
these difficulties in the East Asian nations. We also
look at the impact of these events on U.S. exports of
food products during 1997, 1998, and early 1999.
An Economic Snapshot of the United States
and Europe Prior to 1997
Before we examine the events directly affect-
ing Asi& we present a brief backdrop of the eco-
nomic status of the United States and Europe just
prior to the Asian difficulties of 1997–98.
The US. Economic Picture in the A4id-1990s
The U.S. eeonomywashumming alongat abrisk
clip duringthe years immediatelyprior to the Asian
CurrencyCrisis(Table1).GDP growthhad beenrela-
tively strongfollowingthe brief recessionin the early
1990s.Growthduringthe first three quartersof 1997








highlevelsofthe 1980sandearly1990s.Journal of Food Dis@ibution Research 74 March 2000
Table 1. U.S. Macroeconomic Data, 1981-98.
Real GDP UnEmpl Inflation Interest Mortgage
Year(s) Growth Rate Rate Rate Rate
1981-85 3.1 8.3 6.1 10.21 13.3
1986–90 3,1 5.9 4.3 7.34 9.8
1991 -0.9 6.8 4.2 5.49 9,3
1992 2.7 7,5 3.0 3,57 8,2
1993 2.3 6.9 3,0 3.14 7.2
1994 3.5 6,1 2.6 4.66 7.5
1995 2.3 5.6 2,8 5.59 7.9
1996 3.4 5.4 3.0 5,09 7.8
1997 3.9 4.9 2.3 5.18 7.7
1998 3.7 4.5 1.6 4.85 7.1
SourceU.S.Council ofEconomic Advisors(1999).TIEinterestratertyxxtedisthesix-monthTreasuryBill.Themortgagerateis“New
HomeMortgageYields.’”
All this was good economic news for U.S. con-
sumers. The good economic conditions allowed
many consumers the freedom to adjust their spend-
ing habits. Americans of all ages were actively
investing in their retirement finances, with heavy
doses of growth mutual funds in their portfolios.
The major objective of growth funds is the growth
of the asset base value. Growth fund managers hold
a large percentage of equity (stocks) in their portfo-
lios. As the demand for mutual funds grew stronger
and stronger, the demand for U.S. stocks contained
in those fimds also grew, and Wall Street’s Dow
Jones Index experienced incredible growth. Stock
and mutual find maikets went “through the roof’ in
the mid- 1990s. After a sluggish year of 2 percent
growth in 1994,the Dow Jones Index of 30 leading
industrials grew 33 percent in 1995, 26 percent in
1996,23 percent in 1997, and 16 percent in 1998.
The Vanguard 500 Index Fund a firedthat attempts
to duplicate the S&P 500 portfolio, showed returns
of 1.2, 37.5, 22.9, 33.2, and 28.6 percent in these
same years. Returns were so strong during these
years that Alan Greenspan was quoted in late 1996
and early 1997 as being somewhat skeptical of the
“excessive optimism” and “irrational exuberance”
being exhibited in the markets. As we discuss later,
the excessively high prices and returns in the U.S.
markets led many investors and fired managers to
search for bargains in what became known as
“emerging markets.” Therein we fmd a direet tie
between the strength of the U.S. economy and the
Asian Currency Crisis.
Europe and the Advent of the Euro
During the height of the Asian Curreney Crisis,
Europe was also on the verge of a major transi-
tionhransformation. The European Monetary Union
was only a fewmonths awayfrom the introductionof
itsnew curreney,the Euro. Preparationshad beenlong
and difficultforthenationsinvolved. Gettingpolitical
and public support for the Euro had been almost easy
comparedto therigorsof gettingtheirfinrmckiihouses
in order. Europeanmonetary authorities,in the Maas-
tricht Treaty of 1991,had set five conditions (known
as convergencecriteria)for eaeh nation that chose to
entertheEuropeanMonetaryUnion. For eaehcountry
(1)theinflationratecmddnot bemore than 1.5percent
above the three community nations with the lowest
rate (2) long-term interestrates could not exeeed by
more than two points the average interest rate of the
three ecmnties with the lowest inflation rates; (3)
budget deficits could not exceedmore than 3 percent
of GDP, (4)overaUgovernmentdebt couldnot exeeed
60 percentof GDP; and (5)the averageexehangerate
couldnot frillby morethan2.25 pereentof the average
of the EMS (EuropeanMonetary System)for thetwo
years prior to their joining (Salvatore, 1998). Three
nations (llmrnar~ Swed~ and the United Kingdom)
opted out of the Euro, and Greeee fded to meet the
establkhed criteria.
By early 1998, only three of the 11 nations
seeking to join the Euro had met the convergence
criteria in full-Finlan~ France, and Luxembourg.
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government deficits within acceptable ranges, and
exchange rate movements had presented no prob-
lems. However, eight of the 11 nations were out of
range with respect to overall indebtedness. Debt-to-
GDP ratios for 1997 ranged from a low of 6.7
percent in Luxembourg to a high of 122.2percent in
Belgi~ with two other nations (Italy and Greece)
also above 100 percent. Recognizing that years of
prior fiscal abuse had brought some nations to the
point where their indebtedness problem was not
something that could be solved in the short run and
that debt-to-GDP ratios were in fact on the decline
in the most troublesome nations, European monetary
authorities moderated their standards somewhat with
respect to overall debt and decide~ in May
1998, to allow all 11nations (excluding Greece)
to participate.
Getting their financial houses in order re-
quired a great deal of restraint on the part of
national monetary authorities. The appropriate
policy combination is contractionary monetary
policy to bring down inflation and contractionary
fiscal policy to bring down government deficits
and to keep interest rates low in the face of con-
tractionary monetary policy. The result of this
simultaneous use of contractiomuy monetary and
fiscal policy, together with substantial capital
outflows associated with lower interest rates in
Europe and high returns in the United States, has
been slow growth and high unemployment in
much of Europe. By early 1998, aggregate unem-
ployment in the Euro countries was almost 12
percent. Unemployment was on the order of 4–5
percent in only three Euro countries-Austri% the
Netherlands, and Portugal. It stood at 8–9 percent
in Belgium, Ireland, and Germany and was dou-
ble-digit in Finland, France, Italy, and Spain
(topping out at 19 percent in Spain). Aggregate
growth in the Euro area was also slow, atjust over
2 percent. High unemployment and slow growth,
in turn, led to reduced imports of manufactured
goods during these years. The volume of Western
European manufactured imports, which had aver-
aged 18 percent growth per year between 1985
and 1995, increased only three percent in 1996
and 5 percent in 1998, with negative growth of
one percent during 1997. Because Europe consti-
tutes some 15 to 20 percent of Asian trade, this
reduction in trade almost certainly contributed to
the difficult macroeconomic conditions in Asia
during 1997-98.
The Asia Currency Crisis of 1997-98
The East Asian troubles can be traced to a
number of causes. We examine two: (1) an overly
zealous export orientation on the part of East Asian
nations and (2) excess Western investment, together
with ftilure on the part of Western and Eastern
public and private financial authorities to provide
oversight, guidance, and correction to managers in
these newly emerging economies.
Export Orientation
Export-led growth has long been one of the
leading strategies for economic advancement in
many lesser-developed countries. It has been a
particularly dominant strategy for many of the
nations of East Asia for the past few decades.
Export-led development was so strong during
the 1970s and 1980s that four of these Asian
nations—Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore,
and Taiwan-became known as the “East Asian
Tigers,” while smaller successes led to a “Big
Cats” moniker for Indonesia, Malaysia, Thai-
land, and the Philippines. The term “newly
industrialized countries” also was coined as a
reflection of the activities of these countries and
others like them.
Data on export growth for a number of re-
gions and countries, including seven “Currency
Crisis” countries, are reported in Table 3. Growth
rates were calculated for three prior five-year
periods (1980-85, 1985-90, and 1990–95) and
three recent one-year periods (1995-96, 1996–97,
and 1997–98). Growth rates for each of the peri-
ods are calculated as the percent growth in exports
between the boundary years divided by the num-
ber of years. From 1985 to 1995, the average
annual growth rate of exports for the seven Cur-
rency Crisis countries was 24 percent while their
GDP growth rate was in the 7–1Opercent range.
World export growth during this time, both in the
industrial economies and the lesser developed
countries, was one-half the rate of the East Asian
nations, on the order of 12–13 percent per year.
Over the next few years, only the Philippines
remained in double-digit export growth, largely
because of their substantial amount of trade with
the United States. The other six nations averaged
4 percent annual export growth during 1996 and
1997, and all six experienced negative export
growth during 1998.’76 March 2000 Journal of Food Distribution Research
Table 2. European Union: Convergence Indicators, 1997.
Consumer Government Government
Price Inflation Interest Rates Deficit-to-GDP Ratio Debt-to-GDP Ratio
Germany 1.8 5.6 -2,7 61.3
France 1.2 5.5 -3.0 57.7
Italy 1.7 6,7 -2.7 121.6
Spain 2.0 6.3 -2.6 68.3
Netherlands 2.2 5.5 -1,4 72,1
Belgium 1.6 5.7 -2.1 122.2
Austria 1.3 5.6 -2.5 66.1
Finland 1.2 5.5 -0.9 55.8
Portugal 2.2 6.2 -2.5 63.4
Ireland 1.5 6.7 0.9 66.3
Luxembourg 1.4 5.6 1.7 6.7
United Kingdom 2.8 7.0 -1.6 54.5
Denmark 2.2 5.6 0,4 63.3
Sweden 0.9 6.5 -0.4 76.6
Greece 5.4 9.8 -4.0 108.7
All EU 1.9 6.1 -2.3 73.0
Reference Value 2,6 7.8 -3.0 60,0
Source:IMF(1998).
Table 3. Growth in World Merchandise Exports for Selected Time Periods, 1980-98.






































































































































Developed Economies 0.1 18.6 8.0 3.0 2,0 0.4
Developing Economies -3.3 12.1 12,4 8.2 6.8 -6.9
Source:WTO(1999).RuppeL FredJ. and Charles R. Handy Transition, Transformation,and Turmoil 77
A substantial portion of the reduction in ex-
ports from the Currency Crisis countries during
1997 and 1998 was due to a reduction in imports in
both Western Europe and Japan. EU imports were
down $30 billion in 1997 while Japanese imports
were down $11 billion in 1997 and $48 billion in
1998. The other major factor was the growth in
exports from China. China’s export growth averaged
27 percent a year between 1985 and 1995. Their
export growth was down somewhat in 1996 but
increased 21 percent in 1997. China’s $33 billion in
increased exports between 1996 and 1998more than
offset the loss of $27 billion in those six East Asian
countries whose exports were suffering. The export-
led development that had brought the East Asian
miracle growth in the 1980s and early 1990s had
become the victim of China’s active entIYinto world
markets, especially the small manufacturers that had
been the backbone of these countries’ merchandise
exports. Chin% a low-wage but relatively educated
country of 1.2billion people (three times the size of
the seven smaller Asian nations listed in Table 3),
was ableto exert its comparative advantage at atime
when these other nations could ill afford to lose their
markets.
Excess Western Investment
A second growth strategy chosen by many
countries is to entice foreign capital into the country,
either as actual physical investment (fwtones, infra-
structure, service industries) or in the form of finan-
cial capital, both debt (loans) and equity (stock
ownership). Potential investors include private
manufacturing, investment, and lending firms; gov-
ernment assistance and government-backed lending
agreements; and multilateral organizations and
agencies like the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The recipients of the invest-
ment finds can be either private-sector fmns or
governments, Problems arose in East Asia when
Western investors, primarily private-sector banks
and mutual iimd managers, became overly aggres-
sive in their lending and in their investment portfolio
management.
Mutual finds managers make money when
they “buy low, sell high.” Accordingly, higher and
higher prices on Wall Street in the mid-1990s be-
came less and less attractiveand forced fired manag-
ers to look for new asset growth possibilities. Fund
managers invested heavily in what later became
known as “emerging markets” fimds. Although
higher returns typically entail greater risks, in order
to stay competitive, find managers became more
and more willing to accept these greater risks and
more likely to “look the other way” when they saw
signs of market weakness that normally would have
raised a flag of caution over a particular transaction.
With interest rates in the United States and Europe
at relatively low levels, lenders also began to look
for higher returns elsewhere. Aga@ Asian markets
showed continuing promise of strong retums—
returns for which a higher-risk premium could be
charged. In addition, many Asian markets were
closed to outside ownership, leaving investors with
only a lending option if they wished to benefit born
these growing markets. As the number of potential
lenders seeking Asian borrowers grew, however,
lenders became somewhat more lax in their initial
loam analyses and less stringent in their ongoing
oversight. In additio~ an increasingnumber of loans
became high interest, short-term business transac-
tions rather than low-rate, long-term investments.
There wde anumber of otherproblems associ-
ated with the large influx of Western investment.
Where large volumes of money are concerned,
regulation and oversight can often be a problem.
Robert Samuelson (1998) detailed some of these
problems:
These countries tried to maximize the bene-
fits of the process while ~g changes
to their politics and commerce. Mutual de-
ception flourished. Countries like Korea and
Russia pretended that they were changing
more than they had. American, Europea
and Japanese bankers, executives, and gov-
ernment officials pretended the claims were
true--or might become true. Loans were
made on the basis of incomplete or iludty fi-
nancial statements.Or they were made on the
faith that if a loan went sour, someone (the
government, the IMF) would cover the
losses. “Crony” capitalism often meant cor-
ruption contractswon with bribes; favoritism
for the well-connected.
Samuelson (1998) cites a study by a group called
Transparency International that ranked Russia
fourth, Indonesia seventi and Thailand 14th in
corruption, as judged by global executives and
country specialists.78 March 2000 Journai of Food Distribution Research
Other problems can be added to this list that
are more internal to the countries themselves, inde-
pendent of Western influence-such as protection-
ism (both in their merchandise trade and in their
failure to allow foreign ownership of domestic
assets); exportism and the failure to properly de-
velop domestic markets; and (to paraphrase Samuel-
son) a set of cultural values that fails to emphasize
the features of competition profit, and freedom that
are inherently tied to capitalism. Add to this mix
over-zealous investors, poor oversight and analysis,
and bad accounting practices, and the result is a
bottom line of too little market discipline.
The net resultof this investment activitywas atre-
mendous amount of Western capitalflowing into the
East Asian countries.Samuelson(1998)showsprivate
capital flows to Indonesiarising from near zeroin the
early 1990sto morethan $20 biUionin 1996andthen
f~g dramatically in 1997. He *owed a similar
result for Thailand-although Thailandstartedfrom a
somewhat higher capitalinvestment base in the early
1990s, it also rose to more than $20 billion in private
capital inflows in 1995 and fell into a net capital out-
fi’owstatusby 1997.Finally,and most dramaticallyof
all,private capitalflowsto SouthKorearose from $5-
10billion in the early 1990sto more than $40 billion
in 19%, with a flowrevemalof morethau $60billion
in 1997. To quote Samuelson (1998): “Countries
became overdependent on foreign capiti whick
having enteredin huge amounts, is trying to leavethe
same way.” James Buchan (1998) wrote, “It now
appears that ‘westerncapital’ like steroidsto an ath-
lete, was excessively stimulating. Western lending
seems to have distorted local economies and per-
petuated shady or incompetent oligarchies. At the
f~st hint of trouble it dried up.” Lester Throw
(1998) provides an insightfid analysis into this
capital flight phenomenon:
The sequenceof events in a crasharewell
known. Some assetrises in valueto levels far
above those that canbe sustained. . . . Every
investor imagines that he will be able to see
the end coming and get out in tire-but few
do. As assetprices fall, what had been good
loans become bad loans. Adequate collateral
becomes inadequatecollateral,andloanswith
inadequate collateralget called for payment.
Fearfid of defaultsor short of liquiditythem-
selves, banks don’t renew short-term loans
that normally would be automatically rolled
over. Working capital dries up. Even finan-
cially sound firms find that they cannot pay
their bills sincethey are
suddenly unexpectedly asked to repay loans
and pro-pay suppliers. Business firms that
cannot fiance themselvesgo broke.
Worried aboutpreservingtheir wealti in-
siders and outsiders convert their holdings to
currenciesthat arenot expectedto depreciate.
Vast amountsof money leavethe country;the
curreneyplunge$ therealcost ofpayinginter-
nationalloans*, andthe centralbankhasto
beg forloansfromthe IMF.And when central
banks lack internationalreserve currencies,. .
.evencompanieswith sufficientfinds inlocal
currency cannot get the necessary foreign
fnnds to repay their international loans. A
business crisisbemmes a crisis for the coun-
try. The contagionspreadsto other countries.
Brazilhas beenveryshaky intheafbmathof
the Asian collapse.
The problem before the collapse is not in
knowing thatpriceswill fu but in predicting
the timing and speed of the downti. Eco-
nomic models are good at describing flmda-
mental forces and pressures, but are of little
use whenit comesto timing. What is clearby
now is that crashesare not set off by outside
speculatorswho see internal weaknesses and
attack. The first investors to leave the local
market are the local investors who have the
best information.Indonesianindustrialistsgot
their money out of Indonesia first since they
were the ones who had borrowed money in
dollars. . . .Outsiders arethe last to know.
Impacts on U.S. Food Products Exports
The Asian Currency Crisis began on July 2,
1997, with the devaluation of the llai baht. Realis-
tically, however the Crisis did not hit home for U.S.
citizens until late in August 1998. On Monday,
August 31, the Dow Jones Index experienced a 512-
point drop (a loss of 6.4 percent) and, at that point,
had lost almost 20 percent from its July 17 peak of
9,338. In fact, the close on August 31 was almost
1,000 points lower than its closejust 10 days earlier
(an 11.7 percent decline). The impact beeame more
pronounced over the next few months as the U.S.
trade gap widened and export industries watched
their sales dwindle. The loss in exports was particu-
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food processing firms, since East Asian nations had
become leading destinations for U.S. agricultural
and food product exports.
Processed food includes all foo~ beverages
and related products that fall within the Standard
Industrial Classification Code 20 (SIC-20), Food
and Kindred Products. SIC-20 contains 49 separate
food processing industies-including fish and
seafood meat andpoultry products, hides and skins,
distilled liquors, pet food and animal feeds, and fats
and oils. East Asian markets have historically been
among the leading markets for U.S. processed food
exports. Japq South Kore& Taiwan and Hong
Kong all ranked among the top 10 processed food
export destinations during 1990–94, together
claiming 36.5 percent of total U.S. processed food
exports during this time period (Neff et al.). In this
sectiow we examine how the Asian and European
macroeconomic developments discussed in the first
part of the paper afi?ectedU.S. processed food ex-
ports to three regions: Asi& Europe, and Latin
America First however, we compare trends in U.S.
exports of processed foods with the volume of sales
from U.S.-owned processed food affiliates located
in foreign countries (FDI).
U.S. Export Growth vs. FDI
Exports are not the only way in which U.S.
food processors accessinternationalmarkets. In fact
sales of processed food from U.S.-owned affiliates
abroad are larger and growing faster than trade as a
means of international wmmerce in the food indus-
try. Sales by U.S.-owned affiliates in other countries
are estimated to be five times larger than U.S. proc-
essed food exports in 1999 (Table 4). Sales from
U.S. affiliates abroad increased 7.4 percent annually
during 1990–99, to $145 billion annually. During
this same time, U.S. exports increased at an average
annual rate of 4.3 percent. Exports increased steadily
through 1997, reaching $30. I biIlion, but decIined
6 percent in 1998. Exports were off another 8.8
percent for the fust half of 1999 an~ for the full
calendar year, are estimated to fall about 6 percent
to $27.6 billion. Due to the strong U.S. economy,
processed food imports continued to grow in 1998,
increasing 5.8 percent to a record $32.0 billion and
resulting in a trade deficit of $2.6 billion, the fist
trade deficit in processed foods since 1991. In 1999,
the trade deficit for processed food could be closeto
$5 billion if food imports continue to grow at a 6
percent annual rate.
Exports to Asia
U.S. exports of processed foods held up sur-
prisingly well during 1997 but fell off substantially
in 1998 to all major Asian markets except China
(Table 5). Exports to Japm historically the United
States’ largest export mark~ fell 12percent in 1998
after also declining in 1996 and 1997. Most of the
decline was in seafood and meat products. Exports
to China rose 30 percent, to $841 millio~ largely
due to increased soybean oil sales. Hong Kong
exports dropped 17 percent. The largest absolute
decline was to South Korea where exports fell 38
percent fi-om$1.5 biUionin 1997 to $948 million in
1998. By January 1998, the value of the won had
fden more than 50 percent, and for the fidl year,
Korea’s economic output declined almost 6 percent.
Most of the export decline was in beef, hides and
skins, and seafood products. Indonesi% a relatively
small market for U.S. exports, had the largest per-
centage decline, more than 51 percent.
Table 4. Global Sales of U.S. Affiliates Abroad vs. U.S. Exports of Processed Foods.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
-------------------------------------------billion dollws------------------------------------------------
Aflliate Sales 76,0 82,3 87.6 95.4 104.9 115,3 121.2 131.0 140.0 145.0
U.S. Exports 18.9 10.3 22.8 23.4 26.2 29.4 30.1 31.3 29.4 27.6
Atliliate-Index 100 108 115 126 138 152 159 172 184 191
Exports-Index 100 107 121 124 139 156 159 166 156 146
Sources:Exports-USDOC, CensusBureawAffiliateSales-USDOC, BureauofEconomic Analysis(atlliate salesfor 1997–99are
USDNERS estimates).80 March 2000
Table 5. Changes in U.S. Processed Food Exports to Asia.
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Country 1998 January-June 1999
------------o/o change from one year prior-------------
Japan -11.8 1.3
China 29.6 -61.7
Hong Kong -17.2 -19.0








In stark contrast to the difficulties in 1998, ex-
port markets experienced a dramatic turnaround in
1999. During the first half of the year, U.S. exports
to Japan and to all seven East Asian crisis countries
increased. South Korea’s economy grew at a 7.3
percent clip during the frosthalf of 1999, and U.S.
exports to South Korea rose 40 percent, largely on
the basis of strong poultry and red meat sales. Ex-
ports to Malaysia and Indonesia were up 48 percent
and 50 percent, respectively. Although exports to
these countries were up sharply, they still were not
back to the levels obtained in 1997. Exports to
Japan started growing slowly in 1999 after three
years of decline. Unfortunately, exports to Chin%
after growing 30 percent in 1998, fell 62 percent in
the fmt half of 1999, primarily due to sharply lower
soybean oil sales.
Exports to Europe
Until 1998,Europe had been a slow-but-steady
growth market for U.S. processed food exports.
Both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are
among the top 10U.S. export markets. But in 1998,
U.S. exports declined to five of the seven largest
European markets (Table 6). And with the exception
of the Netherlands and Belgium, the decline in U.S.
exports to Europe intensified during the first half of
1999. Exports to Spti Italy,and France fell 36,44,
and 34 percent,respectively. The export decline was
broad-based across many processed food products
but was deepest for beer, distilled liquor, and soy-
bean oil and other vegetable oil products. This
decline in exports is a direct reflection of the slow
economic growth and high unemployment rates in
European countries that was discussed earlier.
Exports to Latin America
Mexico andmuch of SouthAmericahavebeena
growing market for U.S. processed food exports
during the 1990s. As a group, Mexico, Venezuel@
Brazil, Argentin%and Chile accountedfor 12percent
of U.S. exports in 1998. Mexieo alone aeeountedfor
9.7 percent of U.S. exports and is our third largest
market. Table 7 shows that exports to Mexico rose
18.9pereentin 1998,followinga 19.6percentincrease
in 1997.Meat andpoultryproductsarethelargestU.S.
exports to Mexieo. In South Americz therewas solid
export growth to Venezuel~ Argen@ and Chile.
However, Brazil’seconomic slowdown wasrefleeted
in an 11.3pereentdrop in U.S. exports.
The sharpdeclinein U.S. exportsthat sweptEast
Asiain 1998 spreadto Latin Amerieaduringthe first
half of 1999.Exportsto Mexieofell 5perce@thefirst
declinesince 1995.Most of the declinewas inpoultry
and wet com milling produets. Brazil devalued its
currencyby 40 percentin January 1999.This contrib-
uted to the additionaldecline of U.S. exportsby 34.6
pereent. Weak domestic eeonomies and high unem-
ployment also led to export declines to Venezuel~
Argent@ and Chile.Ruppel, FredJ and Charles R. Hanc& Transition, Transformation,and Turmoil 81
Table 6. Changes in U.S. Processed Food Exports to Europe.
Country 1998 January-June 1999
-----------------o/o change from one year prior---------------
The Netherlands -23.6 5.7







Table 7. Changes in U.S. Processed Food Exports to Latin America.
Country 1998 January-June 1999








Wheredo U.S. processed food exports go from
here? Evidence shows that U.S. exports are very
sensitive to macroeconomic conditions in destina-
tion countries. The quick and strong economic
recovery in most Asian countries bodes well for
U.S. exports. Higher GDP growth into the year 2000
is also forecast for most European nations. The
biggest question is how quicklythe economies of the
major South American countries recover. One plus
is that U.S. foreign direct investment into Asia and
Latin America has continued even during the dow.n-
tum, which should help in the recovery process.
Few events in rec6ut years have brought to
light the complete interdependencies of the interna-
tional financial system as well as the Asian Currency
Crisis of 1997–98. Events in Asia Europe, and the
United States all contributed to the Crisis to some
extent but also helped to mitigate the depth and
breadth of the Crisis by their combined response. If
our global economic and financial system has, in
fact, dodged a bullet and all the Crisis countries
recover (as has the U.S. stockmarket), then we need
to learn fi-omthe experience. A number of sugges-
tions have been offaed by some of the authors and
financial experts already mentioned (Greenspan,
Thurow, Samuelsou Soros) as to what global finan-
cial leaders can do to prevent such a crisis from
occurring again. Clearly, nations need to focus on
building internal markets for their products. Even
though nations may desire the gains that can be
obtained from an export orientation, they also need
to manufacture for their home markets, or create
home markets for those goods that are typically
destined for export markets. This focus may require
government investment (or oversight of private
investment) in both industry and infiasttucture.
A natural expectation is to look to foreign fi-
nancial markets as a source of capital. To the extent
that foreign capital is utilized, long-term capital
should be sought to replace short-term capital.82 A4arch2000 Journal of Food Distribution Research
FinanciaJ authorities may be forced to take some
losses in divesting themselves of short-term liabili-
ties, but the fhtare gains may well exceed those
losses. In order to make internal markets more
attractive to future foreign capital, government
authorities need to be able to guarantee financial
institutions that meet international standards for risk
management and accountability, possibly with
international supervision over national regulatory
authorities. In additiou nations need to open their
markets to greater foreign ownership of domestic
industry so as to benefit fkomthe competition inher-
ent in foreign ownership. Currency and capital
controls in financialmarkets areno less harmthl than
tariff and quota protections in goods markets.
Advanced economies and global financialinsti-
tutions share some portion of the responsibility for
~g fhture crises. There is good reason to
suggest that the strong nations in any international
region take the necessary steps to ward off fiture
difficulties withintheir region. That is, Japan and the
United States should take primary leadership where
Asian and LatinAmericannations are concemd and
the European Union should take the lead in building
the emergingnationsof Centraland EasternEurope.It
is clear that the relative weakness of the Japanese
economy wasamajor contributingfactorto the Asian
CurrencyCrisis.Likewise,theprolongedfailureof the
United Statesto pay its IMF dues has weakened the
ability of the IMF to respond when needed. Both
national authorities and multinational organizations
need to consider some form or degree of debt relief,
especially for those countries that are taking steps to
open theirmarketsandtheirfinancialinstitutions.Debt
burdens are substantialin many countries and exact
quiteatoll whenthat debtis at disadvantageousterms.
Providing more equity finance and less debt finance
would be a good first step.
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